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Abstract
There are an abundance of measures available to the standard digital device users which
provide the opportunity to act in an anti-forensic manner and conceal any potential digital
evidence denoting a criminal act. Whilst there is a lack of empirical evidence which evaluates
the scale of this threat to digital forensic investigations leaving the true extent of engagement
with such tools unknown, arguably the field should take proactive steps to examine and record
the capabilities of these measures. Whilst forensic science has long accepted the concept of
toolmark analysis as part of criminal investigations, ‘digital tool marks’ (DTMs) are a notion
rarely acknowledged and considered in digital investigations. DTMs are the traces left behind
by a tool or process on a suspect system which can help to determine what malicious
behaviour has occurred on a device. This article discusses and champions the need for DTM
research in digital forensics highlighting the benefits of doing so.
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1 Introduction
Whilst forms of digital data now play a role in the investigation and policing of many criminal
acts, there is increasing concern surrounding the use of tools and processes which may
hamper the effectiveness of any examination methods designed for this evidence type. This
view was expressed recently by The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology in the
United Kingdom.
‘Some criminals are aware of the techniques available to law enforcement and try
to hide their digital activity. The processes they use, known as anti-forensics, tend
only to occur in the most complex cases.’ (The Parliamentary Office of Science
and Technology, 2016 at p.3).
Similar assertions were also made by Pajek and Pimenidis as early as 2009 who indicated
that ‘in many cases investigation with such countermeasure techniques in place appears to
be too expensive, or too time consuming to carry out. Often a case can end up being
abandoned and investigators are left with a sense of personal defeat’ (Pajek and Pimenidis,
2009 at p.145). Any course of action which prohibits the effective investigation of a criminal
act will naturally instill concern in the digital forensic (DF) community (and indeed any forensic
science community), yet it remains relatively unknown (a position which is likely to persist) as
to the extent of use of such measures. Media coverage of so-called anti-forensic (for simplicity
the term ‘anti-forensic’ will be utilised until further analysis in Section 2) measures in the DF
field remains minimal, perhaps a by-product of the use of these processes; effective anti-
forensic measures may never be detected in order to raise the hypothetical alarm. Further,
there is little empirical research demonstrating evidence covering current so called anti-
forensic tool usage and perceptions, as well as an assessment as to the extent of public and
criminal engagement with privacy enhancing tools for anti-forensic purposes. Whilst limited
evidence justifying concern maybe available, this alone should not be grounds for overlooking
the threat posed by applications and procedures designed (or as a consequence of their use)
to frustrate a DF investigation.
In the wider discipline of forensic science, ‘tools’ are often utilised by criminals to gain a
mechanical advantage in many forms of illicit activities. This tool will leave impressions in a
surface, and is often referred to as trace or impression evidence. For example, the use of wire
cutters could be used to gain access to a property. As a parallel to DF, in routine crime scene
work, the crime scene investigator (CSI) is often limited for time, yet it is paramount they draw
upon their knowledge, experience, and interactions with others to identify meaningful trace
evidence (Wyatt 2013). Failure to locate locate and recover impression evidence can be
unforgivable (Bodziak 2000), and in turn prevent a full forensic analysis which will certainly
misdirect the interpretation of events that occured. As a result, much as been published on
the recovery, reliability and identification of physical toolmarks in forensic science (Refer to:
Nichols 2018). However, in the field of DF, comparable research is sparse.
In 2016, Conlan, Baggili, and Breitinger offered comment on the requirement for DF to invest
effort in the further examination and evaluation of the threats caused by techniques which
obstruct DF processes. Such a sentiment was also offered by Al Fahdi et al., in 2013. The
need to increase research activity in the anti-forensic area stems from the potential for those
practitioners encountering such processes within an investigation failing to fully understand
the impact they have had on a device under investigation.
The potential impact of under-researched anti-forensic processes is threefold:-
1. Failing to detect anti-forensic process usage on a system may prevent an effective
investigation of both the local device being carried out and crucially, external sources
of information. For example, tools removing suspicious Internet related content may
cause a practitioner to assume no illicit activity has taken place. As a result, potential
further sources of external evidence such as retained Internet Service Provider (ISP)
logs or other external service data may never be requested and queried in order to
identify the true extent of a criminal act.
2. Under researched anti-forensic procedures may lead to missed forensic opportunities
where tools and procedures may leave behind ‘digital tools marks’ (discussed in
Section 3) on a system which describe the functions it may have performed, offering
indications as to what data has been tampered with.
3. Under researched anti-forensic procedures provide a barrier to establishing the true
capability and effectiveness of these features, which in turn prevent any limitations and
weaknesses being exploited for the purposes of evidence recovery.
This work seeks to emphasise the need to take note of processes which can disrupt a DF
practitioner’s ability to accurately recover and interpret digital data. Section 2 begins by
examining the correctness of current definitions of ‘anti-forensics’ (AF) in relation to DF and
seeks to redefine the threats posed by this area. Section 3 introduces the concept of digital
tool mark analysis, an under-researched area in DF. Finally, section 4 examines the
challenges and areas for progressing this area of research.
2 Discussion
We are firmly within a technology driven era with digital devices documenting many aspects
of an individual's’ life both passively and intentionally. Consequently, this digital data can often
support the effective investigation of a criminal act should one take place, providing this
information can be both accessed and its reliability determined. The issue remains that this
cannot be guaranteed in all cases. There is no doubt regarding the ability of digital evidence
to enhance the policing of crime (with digital evidence featuring prominently within many digital
crimes), yet its volatile nature means that its destruction and tampering in some cases can be
attained with arguably relative ease. With societal shifts towards greater emphasis being
placed on digital privacy and data protection, and, the use of privacy enhancing technologies
to achieve these goals, concerns should be raised over the potential for an increasing number
of seized devices to have retained less potential relevant digital content. Often measures
which impact the presence and accuracy of digital evidence on a device are placed under the
umbrella term of AF, a term which arguably misrepresents the threat posed in this area for DF
and one which requires further analysis.
2.1 Anti-Forensics
AF is a term often adopted in DF to describe any procedure involved in the removal or
degrading of the reliability of a piece(s) of digital evidence which a practitioner may expect to
find or rely upon on a hypothetical standard device. Despite such a definition capturing the
use of AF tools, it also subsequently describes an act which can be achieved via a number of
processes which are standard to many operating systems and devices, coined here as
‘disruptive technologies’ - those which as a by product of their use can negatively impact DF
processes. A problem with the term AF is that it is used to arbitrarily categorize all software
and hardware which at any given time thwarts DF investigatory processes, regardless of
intention and malice. Whilst there are tools designed specifically with the goal of being AF,
this can also be achieved as a by-product of many legitimate privacy enhancing software
features, for example private browsing modes which may reduce the presence of Internet
browsing history on a system (Said et al., 2011; Marrington et al., 2012; Chivers, 2014). The
issues surrounding the defining of AF can be seen in the work of Al Fahdi et al., (2013) who
note that ‘arguably both encryption and steganography are a form of Anti-forensics’. We
suggest this is not wholly accurate. Despite both techniques potentially forming part of an AF
process, they are not always AF per-se and both techniques may be utilised in legitimate
privacy and security enhancing ways or with the intention to do so. A person's mens-rea is
important when trying to establish AF context and to be AF, both techniques must be utilised
in an intentional manner, and with the intention for their use to be AF. In absence of this
intention, there is a risk that any function or process which manipulates digital data in a manner
which negatively impacts a DF investigation is classified as AF.
The need for intention when correctly asserting the AF definition on a tool or process lies with
the fields definition. Forensics is defined as ‘the methods of science to provide information
about a crime’ (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018a). The addition of ‘anti’ (‘opposed to or against a
particular thing or person’ (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018b)) results in a process with an
insinuated intention as being ‘against something’. The need for intention is key to
distinguishing between a true AF process and one which is simply disruptive to forensic
methods. This is acknowledged by Kessler (2007, p.1).
‘anti-forensics is that set of tactics and measures taken by someone who wants to
thwart the digital investigation process’.
Whilst AF tools and procedures provide a threat to DF, they do not solely pose an issue. Many
AF definitions as too narrow, omitting to capture those processes which regardless of
intention, are disruptive to DF methods. Park et al. (2017 at p.31) offer a definition which
covers to a greater degree the threats posed by technologies in this area.
‘Anti-forensics, whether intentionally to disrupt investigations or simply an effort to
make a computer system run better, is becoming of increasing concern to digital
investigators.’ (Park et al., 2017 at p.31).
The above definition provides an all encompassing coverage of acts which may disrupt the
process of extracting and interpreting relevant digital content during an investigation but is
arguably not wholly accurate. Rightly, the intention of a user is highlighted where to be AF,
there must be an intention to disrupt the forensic investigation process. The issue remains
with the latter suggestion of ‘simply an effort to make a computer system run better’ being
capture within the AF definition. Such acts cannot be AF if the user’s initial intention was to
enhance system performance and as a result of such processes, data which would have been
useful during a DF investigation is compromised. Further, many performance enhancing
processes are not designed to be AF, but ‘performance enhancing’. A tool not designed for
the purpose of AFs cannot be an AF tool. However, such processes can be used in an AF
manner, for example where standard procedures such as a ‘disk-defrag’ can be purposed for
AF (reducing the potential for file recovery) as well as for legitimate performance enhancing
abilities. Similarly, acts which simply adopt privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) as part of
standard computer operations which have a byproduct of removing content from a system
which would (should a crime be committed) be beneficial to an investigation cannot fall directly
within this category. The original purpose of many PETs is for security and privacy, not to be
AF, albeit it may be possible to utilise them in such a way.
Being AF is a mindset, and whilst there are dedicated AF tools, these tools are not the only
way to be AF. Arguably AF is a term which can only be applied to a narrow set of applications
which market themselves as for the purpose of combating forensic processes. Such tools are
designed with the intention of removing content from a device which may lead to the
prosecution of an individual who has carried out a criminal act. However these tools do not
form the entirety of the risk posed in this area of DF. It is argued that the following two
categories of threat persist in regards to the area of compromising DF processes:
Category 1: Dedicated AF tools.
Category 2: ‘Disruptive Technologies’.
2.2 Categories of Concern
In 2009 Delp et al., stated that ‘there is an abundance of readily available AF tools that can be
used to mask or erase present digital evidence’. Whilst arguably there are many tools capable
of tampering with potential digital evidence, it is an oversimplification to classify all as AF. The
field of DF must acknowledge that a threat is posed by both dedicated AF technologies
(Category 1) and passive disruptive technologies (Category 2); processes requiring an AF
mind-set in order to be classified as malicious.
2.2.1 Category 1: Dedicated AF tools
For simplification of arguments, those tools designed for AF purposes can be typically placed
in one of the the following six classifications.
1. Data hiding: Data hiding techniques are designed to place digital content beyond the
discovery of an individual (unlike obfuscation where content may be present but non-
intelligible) (Sabir et al., 2018). Data hiding may arguably be the weakest of the anti-
forensic techniques available to a potential offender given the forensic capabilities
available to many DF practitioners. To provide a contextualised example, a standard
desktop computing device often permits full physical access to the digital media and
ultimately it’s operating system. Successful data hiding may rely upon placing content
in uncommon system locations or relying on simply techniques of file name and
extension changes (as any additional obfuscation techniques are likely to fall with
categories 3 and 4 of this list). In such cases, for data hiding techniques to be
successful, reliance is placed on the weakness of the investigating practitioner and
their likelihood to overlook content (or through lack of knowledge) or fail to process this
information with the necessary techniques (file signature analysis, appropriate file
filtering/sorting etc.) to prevent content being missed.
2. Data removal: Data removal (terminology interchangeable with ‘wiping’) techniques
are designed to place target information stored on digital media beyond the powers of
recovery of DF techniques. Whilst standard file deletion does not achieve this by
default (albeit sustained usage of a device leading to data being overwritten may have
a similar effect), data removal involves the intentional and timely removal.
3. Data obfuscation: Obfuscation is a broad term which in the confines of DF is used to
describe the use of algorithms and techniques (encryption, compression) to obscure
data, making it unintelligible until specific access protocols are initiated. This may be
as simple as supplying the correct authentication credentials to decrypt data. What
distinguishes obfuscation methods from removal, is the ability to reverse obfuscation
methods to ensure that data is retrievable by the correct person. The aim of
obfuscation methods is to provide access to content only to those who have be
predetermined.
4. Data manipulation/editing/masking: Examples include GPS Spoofing (Barton and
Azhar, 2017). These methods take existing and meaningful data which a practitioner
could use to reliably describe a set of events on a system and change it. If changes
are detected, the reliability of event reconstruction if knowingly compromised. If such
processes are undetected, erroneous examination results may be acquired.
5. Data adding: Often focus in relation to AF tools lies with the removal of a user’s
incriminating interactions on their system. However, there are tools which may seek to
introduce incriminating evidence (Garfinkel, 2007).
6. Physical destruction: Physical destruction is a traditional AF methods and relies on a
threshold of destruction being reached which places a device beyond the powers of
specialist digital device recovery. Such techniques may be effective when local device
storage is involved, yet with an increasing amount of data being stored remotely by
service providers, physical destruction alone may not always be an effective anti-
forensic technique.
2.2.2 Category 2: Disruptive Technologies
The second category of processes are defined as ‘disruptive technologies’ (See Figure 1).
Disruptive technologies have a primary legitimate function and purpose, which may also have
a detrimental impact on relevant digital data on a device in any subsequent investigation. An
example of such an issue would be the use of a disk defragging utility, a process of reducing
file defragmentation to improve the efficiency of a system drive (Microsoft, 2016). This feature
is non-AF, yet its use can impact the recoverability of data found in unallocated regions of a
disk. As a result, any tool or process of this type is categorized as a disruptive technology
which can be used anti-forensically. The tool itself is not AF, but subject to identifying the
requisite intention of a suspect, it may be used in an AF manner. This raises an issue within
the context of a DF examination - ‘what distinguishes a malicious defrag from a normal one?’.
The challenge with disruptive technology usage in a DF investigation is twofold:
1. Detecting that a disruptive technology has been utilised in a particular instance, given
their function is legitimate system activity which in some cases may be difficult to
distinguish from typical user behaviour.
2. Detecting that a disruptive technology has been used with the intention to be AF,
distinguishing their use from instances such as genuine privacy or performance
enhancing acts.
Whilst the former may be possible, the later challenge of establishing malicious disruptive
technology usage is arguably impossible in many cases. Where a suspect has utilised a
disruptive technology, the challenge is distinguishing genuine system maintenance or PETs
usage from targeted attempts to remove potential behaviours documenting criminality from
their system. The problem lies with establishing normal behaviours on a computer system -
does a ‘normal’ (albeit there is no such thing) user defrag their disk every week? Utilise private
browsing functions for every session? Encrypt their devices by default? There is likely no way
to distinguish such actions and doing so risks undermine the conscientious user. Such acts
highlight the difficulties with defining AF within DF.
As a result, it may not be possible in all cases to establish motive, but detecting disruptive
technology usage in any case may help to explain the absence of, or assess the reliability of
a piece of evidence on a given system. Whilst dedicated AF tools pose an issue, it is argued
that the bigger threat is posed by the disruptive technologies available to many users through
typical device usage which are enacted by a diligent user. Bespoke category 1 AF tools will
always cause fear within DF, their enountered and documented use in a seized device is likely
to be comparatively rare in comparison category 2.
Disruptive technologies can also be sub-grouped into three distinct areas for classification,
notably PETS, operating system functionality and device functionality (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: A breakdown of Category 1 and 2 tools which may hamper DF investigations
A case study - The San Bernardino iPhone: The San Bernardino iPhone provides provides
an example of the difficulties of defining and investigating disruptive technologies. The
scenario itself is briefly defined by Conlan et al., (2016) as follows.
The FBI had to bypass anti-forensic techniques to acquire the iPhone 5C owned by
the San Bernardino County, California government issued to its employee, Syed
Rizwan Farook, one of the shooters involved in the December 2015 San Bernardino
attack that killed 14 people and injured 22. The attackers died, but the iPhone 5C
was recovered. It was locked with a four-digit password hindering the forensic
acquisition process due to built-in anti-forensic techniques that enforce
encryption and auto-wiping the device after multiple unsuccessful password
attempts. (Conlan et al., 2016. p.66-67)
The issues such a description raises is that it assumes that both device passcodes and
subsequent encryption and wiping are AF. This is not the case, but they can be used in an AF
way. Arguably, the iPhone presents an example of a disruptive technology. Password
protection, encryption and wiping on an iPhone device are designed for privacy enhancement
and personal data protection, with many legitimate implementations including those stated by
Apple themselves which include the future selling of a device to ensure all personal content
is removed (Apple, 2018). None of these processes are marketed for the purpose of AF by
Apple. There are two approaches to analysing the San Bernardino iPhone case. The first is
one of luck, and those involved were fortunate to collaborate on a device which at the time of
the incident possessed significant investigatory issues. The second is that the device was
researched and noted as a troublesome device to investigate due to its operating and device
functionality (see Figure 1) and pre-selected intentionally as a disruptive technology to be
used anti-forensically. Determining this mindset may not have been possible to establish in
this case.
Regardless of which category a process falls into, practitioners are challenged with
establishing their impact on a given case and any concerns around evidence recoverability
and reliability. Given that DF investigations are often post mortem, practitioners are left to
investigate the impact of a tool/process at which point the ‘digital tool marks’ (DTMs) left behind
on a system may be crucial to determining what a user has carried out.
3 Toolmarks
The term ‘toolmark’ is a well established concept in the discipline of forensic science. For
example, it is not uncommon for tools such as screwdrivers to be used during the undertaking
of a physical crime when obtaining entry to a prohibited area (Baiker et al 2015). A screwdriver
may be used to pry open a door, and due to the contact between the tool and the surface, the
tool will leave specific characteristic impressions and marks behind. The recovery of this
characteristic (a form of physical evidence) can help identify the type of tool that was initially
used and in some instances identify the exact tool utilized. Similarly, in forensic archaeology,
depending on the properties of the soil, toolmarks may be left in a grave, created by digging
implements such as a spade or machine. As a result, these may be recovered from careful
excavation processes and providing a link as to how the grave was initially dug (Hunter and
Cox 2005). In addition, a fatal stabbing the analysis of a toolmark on the human body can
determine the type of instrument that was used by the suspect (Norman et al 2018). Inevitably,
all criminals use tools, however as Edmond Locard demonstrated, ‘every contact leaves a
trace’. Thus, once a toolmark has been identified at a scene or on a person, it is documented
and in some cases recovered for further analysis. The documentation process utilises
standard photographic recording and then depending on the size of the object or where the
object is located, a silicone casting medium can be applied to copy the mark in situ (Dittmar
et al 2015). The mark, or the silicone cast is then processed in the laboratory where its
characteristics are examined and often compared to a replicated mark.
Normally the analysis is undertaken microscopically by comparing the mark against test
impressions created by a suspected tool (Rowe 2014). There are three different characteristics
that can be identified: class, sub-class, and individual characteristics (Baiker et al 2014). Class
characteristics are determined before manufacture of the tool and possess global properties
that are widely associated with the certain type of tool. The class characteristic is most useful
in determining or refuting whether a toolmark was made by a suspected tool type (Baiker et al
2014). This can be subdivided into further categories such as whether the mark created had
striations (microscopic parallel grooves), were compression / impression marks (an outline of
a tool), or punctures (an outline of a tool, but may have striations associated with it), and
therefore reduce the number of suspected tools in the identification process (Petraco 2010).
A tool’s sub-class characteristics are described as, “discernible surface features that are (1)
produced incidental to manufacture, (2) significant in that they relate to a small group source
(a subset of class to which they belong) and (3) arise from a source which changes over time”
(Baiker et al 2014: 187). Individual characteristics are most useful in specific tool identification
because they are only associated with one tool. For example, the tool will change depending
on how it is used. Therefore these changes, such as indentations, damage, and rust, are
specific to that tool because each tool is used differently. As a result, the tool’s mark left on a
surface will be very different from a generic tool of the same class.
In forensic science, the methods for analysing tool marks are improving and although this
aspect of the discipline has been surrounded by bias and subjectiveness in the past, newer
statistical models using Bayesian and likelihood ratios are improving validation (Kukuchka et
al 2017; Meuwly et al 2017). What is key to note is that forensic science have and continue
develop and hone tool mark detection and identification techniques, benefiting investigation
processes. Yet comparable advancements have not been made with regards to digital
evidence with tool mark considerations being overlooked my academic research.
3.1 Digital Tool Marks
Similar to traditional tool mark analysis, it is possible that when a suspect attempts to interact
with their computing system in a manner which may jeopardize the reliability and availability
of any potential digital evidence, ‘such techniques may leave traces that could alert
investigators to missing evidence.’ (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology,
2016 at p.3). These traces can be classified as DTMs (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Digital tool marks generated as a result of tool usage.
When processes (either category 1 or 2) are initiated, their actions may leave behind
information on a system which describes their usage for a given act. Examples include
standard operating system usage files (e.g. prefetch, link files, executables), a tools specific
footprint on an operating system and its tool-specific logs and file system metadata as a result
of its use.
Whilst those tools deemed wholly AF (category 1) are likely to try and ensure their DTMs are
removed or are limited, this may not always be the case. Further, the challenge of category 2
processes lies with the fact that such usage may not be explicitly logged, particularly where
the process used is a generic operating function for example, logs of historic disk drag usage
may be limited. In this case, a DTM may be established via an analysis of the disk sectors for
the purpose of evaluating contiguous file presences and fragmentation (or lack of). Identifying
DTMs for a given tool/process offer the following benefits to the practitioner.
1. Identify class of tool used: DTMs may help to identify the type of tool used by a suspect
(wiping, data obfuscation etc.).
2. Identify the tool sub-class and individual characteristics: Whilst in some cases,
identifying the tool/process utilised will be possible due to its sustained existence on a
platform (yet to be uninstalled), this may not always be the case. In such instances the
practitioner may be left with the outcome of an AF event with the task of establishing
both what has occurred and what has carried out an AF process. One of the key
benefits of DTMs lies with the potential for them to be both unique and consistent, and
therefore attributable to a specific tool/process. In addition, an identifiable tool/process
may also have known limitations/weaknesses in regards to how it operates which may
be important during an examination to ensure all available trace evidence is recovered
and interpreted correctly post-event.
3. Identify tool usage: DTMs may indicate how a tool/process has been utilised on a
system or even that a tool have been used at all. In the case of data removal a DTM
may reveal the location or type of data which has been subject to removal. In turn,
where data has been manipulated, DTMs may identify the data types which cannot be
trusted as part of an investigation. DTMs may suggest that the absence or
manipulation of data due to AF intent is indeterminate.
4. Identify what it has done: DTMs may reveal what acts have been carried out on a
system. Marks may be bespoke to certain acts where for example secure wiping of
files may alter specific file system metadata which is consistent with the act of wiping
files using application ‘X’. In turn, DTMs might explain why certain evidence types
cannot be found or interpreted in a manner which was to be expected.
5. Effective resource allocation: Although it is dangerous to assume that certain content
may or may not be available without verifying this, in some cases, DTMs may allow a
practitioner to effectively allocate their available investigation resources. For example,
where a known strong encryption algorithm is used, a decision to abandon attempts to
gain access may be taken to prevent case delays where a chance of success is
minimal.
3.2 An Example:- Private Browsing
To provide an example, the simple scenario involving the initiation of a private browsing (PB)
functionality (classified as a disruptive technology (category 2)) is offered (see Figure 3).
Whilst PB does not completely preclude the chance of browser evidence recovery (for
example, memory forensics and related memory artefacts may capture some browsed
content), its core functionality of trying to prevent browsing session data from being locally
stored on a device increases the potential for reduced evidence recovery. Even if a PB mode
simply operates a basic file deletion protocol of notable session data files following the closure
of a PB session (see reportes of early PB implementations), natural overwriting of data pose
a threat to evidential recovery. Often research establishes a primary goal of determining the
effectiveness of a PB session. In the case of PB, this is often through the development of
testing which aims to establish whether browser information can be recovered for the period
of activity subject to PB. The success of a PB session is often determined by the ability to
recover relevant content following an investigation.
Figure 3: Demonstration of a private browsing process.
However, research often lacks consideration of any evidence denoting the frequency of use
of the PB process itself. In the context of PB, this facility can be initiated multiple times
throughout the course of a day in amongst times when standard browsing activity is also taking
place. Determining the frequency of a PB event and the length of time of its initiation may
provide a greater understanding of a suspect’s usage of their device. If it can be established,
both the activation and deactivation times of a PB process can help to provide reasoning
behind the absence of a set of browsing data which a practitioner may expect to find as part
of their investigation. If a PB process can be mapped against periods of ‘data absence’, a
distinction can be made between data removed subject to an intention to be AF, and simply
assumed periods of inactivity on the device itself. In doing so, establishing the frequency of
use of PB provision may also inform future forensic procedures such as approaching external
sources of potential evidence such as Internet Service Providers and their retained content.
Take for example those subject to supervision orders (see for example measures taken for
offences related to sexual offences, hacking etc.) requiring consistent checks of their Internet
browsing history. It remains feasible that all illicit browsing is confined to a PB session which
may be prohibited as part of an order. Whilst evidence of the browsed sites may be gone,
establishing any evidence of PB DTMs may be sufficient to acknowledge a suspect has
breached their supervision order.
4 Moving Forward
The concept of DTM analysis should not be confused with that of anti-anti-forensics (AAF), as
a sub-discipline of DF covering a set of techniques and measures designed to counteract the
operation and results of AF tools (mooted within the call for papers of the popular DFRWS
(2019) conference). Whilst some procedures can be subject to AAF (for example, malicious
encryption cracking), the term AAF does not accurately describe DTM investigation. DTM
research focuses on reverse engineering leftover system data to determine any AF intended
tool usage.
The move towards research focused on DTMs is one which should be viewed as a proactive
one. As a discipline, the presence of recoverable data from a system should not be the only
determinant of success in an investigation and we need to be able to identify when an
individual has taken steps to disrupt investigatory purposes. Whilst establishing an intention
to be AF will always provide a difficulty, DTM research should provide practitioners with a
greater chance of identifying when something has attempted to disrupt or compromise digital
content and the data subject to such procedures. DTM is a new and under researched area
of DF and this work calls for a need for such work to be carried out. At the time of writing, there
are no published works dedicated to DTMs in the context of a DF investigation. Whilst many
publications document the success or failure of AF techniques, few consider their footprint
from use.
Although the concept of AAF offers hope, it is naive to consider that its impact can be
significant in a lot of cases. In some instances AAF is not possible, for example, where the
overwriting of data is something which can be achieved with relative easy and is not reversible.
As a result, the prevention of tackling of tools and procedures which potentially compromise
digital data is likely unpreventable. Instead, focus should be turned towards the traces left
behind by their usage in order to make sense of the available content left on a system post-
event, yet achieving this is difficult.
4.1. How to capture this content:- A DTM Database?
Practitioners of forensic toolmark identification recognised the need to exchange information,
best practices, and to further research in the discipline. To achieve this, The Association of
Firearm and Toolmark Identification was created in 1969. This group has produced a number
of resources including a specialist peer-reviewed journal, a glossary for common terminology,
and they host annual training seminars (AFTE 2018). Similarly, a large number of publications
have been produced on tool marks such as color atlases that form a reference database. For
example, Petraco (2010) published a book which included rationals on decision making,
instructions on methodological approaches, and reference images on tools and the marks that
they produce. For DF practitioners to harvest the value of DTM it requires similar sustained
initiatives which research into both category 1 and 2 processes and the tools available.
Conlan, Baggili, and Breitinger (2016) provide a list of what they categorise as available AF
tools. Whilst this provides an insight into the availability of this content, the next required step
is to examine their DTMs created as a result of their usage. Collating this information into a
single resource may support DF practitioners in their investigations for the reasons previously
noted in this article.
Bad idea?: As with the sharing of any information in relation to the forensic sciences, it is not
impossible for it to be accessed and utilised in a malicious way. Therefore arguably, a DTM
database would have to have vetted access and be a non-public resource. As a result, it would
prevent those seeking to commit criminal acts from upskilling and identifying those tools which
performance the best. Further, the resource should not be a resource for tool developers to
hone their AF applications.
Assuming that DTM data should be investigated, collected, and stored, the question remains
as to what should be recorded. This following is a breakdown of key information required:-
1. Tool/process effectiveness: An important feature of AF evaluation is determining
whether a tool/process is successful in what it claims to do, and if not, to what extent
it performs its functions. Evaluating the effectiveness of a process can ensure that
investigatory resources and effectively implemented and a device is thoroughly
investigated. For example, where a data hiding process is known to be reversible using
protocol ‘X’, this may prevent practitioners from writing-off ever gaining access to this
content under the believe that a utilised cipher may be too difficult to crack.
2. Settings: Distinguishing the default settings of a tool provides an evaluation of the
threat it poses to an investigation. For example, a data-removal tool which by default
simply deletes content and must be customised in order to securely erase content.
Changes of settings to more complex AF measures can impart both knowledge and
intent regarding the tampering of content and possible subsequent masking of an
offence
3. Operating system presence: A tool/processes’ footprint on a device and operating
system should be mapped in order to identify what presence it leaves when operated.
This must be completed for multiple operating system types and devices. In doing so,
it supports the identification of such tools by an investigator, particularly in cases where
a tool may seek to obfuscate its presence and could potentially be overlooked.
4. Operating system interaction: A tool/process must interact with a device’s operating
system in order to carry out its functions. This very act creates a trace within various
operating system artefacts which are potentially recoverable by a practitioner. Whilst
some tools may seek to remove this content they may not do so completely.
Establishing the artefacts left on a system by a tool interacting with it may help to
determine if a tool has been run and subsequently how it has run.
5. DTMs: It is also necessary to identify DTMs which describe the usage of a tool/process
on a system. These describe the characteristics of a tool’s usage on a system, for
example, tools which amended file system metadata to a specific value when
manipulating file data may be a DTM bespoke to tool ‘X’.
6. Tool implementation and metadata: Application files should be hashed and stored to
allow future identification of a tool in other investigations. Installer file metadata and
hash values should be recorded. Tools version numbers and their course should be
recorded.
5 Concluding Remarks
There is a need to examine and record the impact of tools which may disrupt DF inventory
processes in order to support practitioners identify when a suspect may have taken steps to
conceal illicit behaviours. Such work cannot be solely fixated on the concepts of AF, and a
broader examination of all technologies capable of hindering a DF examination (captured
within both categories of tool/process offered in this article) must be undertaken. In doing so,
the field begins to develop a resource which can help to identify and evaluate both the
capabilities of these tools and the characteristics of their usage on a system which can help
to both explain ‘missing’ data from a system or highlight content which may have had its
reliability compromised.
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